Previous estimates of unfair inequality of opportunity (IOp) are only lower bounds because of the unobservability of the full set of endowed circumstances beyond the sphere of individual responsibility. In this paper, we suggest a new estimator based on a fixed effects panel model which additionally allows identifying an upper bound. We illustrate our approach by comparing Germany and the US based on harmonized micro data. We find significant and robust differences between lower and upper bound estimates -both for gross and net earnings based either on periodical or permanent income -for both countries. We discuss the cross-country differences and similarities in IOp in the light of differences in social mobility and persistence. as well as seminar and conference participants in Bonn, Cologne, Marseille, Milan and Rome for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
Introduction
Preferences for redistribution are systematically correlated with beliefs about the relative importance of e¤ort and luck in the determination of outcomes (see Konow (2003) , Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and Gaertner and Schokkaert (2011) for overviews). Individuals are more willing to accept income di¤erences which are due to individual e¤ort (or laziness) rather than exogenous circumstances (Fong (2001) ). Theories of distributive justice distinguish ethically acceptable inequalities (e.g. due to di¤erences in e¤ort) from unfair inequalities (e.g. due to endowed characteristics). 1 In empirical applications, the main problem is the identi…cation of the latter, i.e. the amount of inequality which is due to circumstances beyond the sphere of individual responsibility. It has been recognized that previous estimates of such inequality of opportunity (IOp henceforth) yield only lower bounds because of the unobservability of the full set of circumstances (e.g. Bourguignon et al. (2007) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) ). In this paper, we suggest a new estimator of IOp based on a …xed e¤ects model which additionally allows identifying an upper bound for unfair inequalities in order to provide the full range of IOp estimates. We illustrate our approach by comparing estimates for Germany and the US -two countries with di¤erent welfare state regimes, attitudes towards inequality and redistribution (see Figure 5 in the Appendix) and social mobility. 2 The concept of equality of opportunity (EOp) in contrast to equality of outcomes (EO) has received considerable attention since the seminal contributions of Roemer (1993 Roemer ( , 1998 , Van de gaer (1993) and Fleurbaey (1995) . 3 The traditional notion of EO refers to an equal distribution of economic outcomes (e.g. well-being, consumption or income) across the population. 4 The EOp theory, in contrast, is interested in the sources of inequality and separates the in ‡uences on the outcomes of an individual into circumstances and e¤ort. Circumstances are de…ned as all factors beyond the sphere of individual control, for which society deems individuals should not be held responsible, such as parental education, gender or ethnic origin. E¤ort, on the other hand, comprises all actions and choices within individual responsibility for which society holds the individual (partially) accountable, e.g. schooling or labor supply decisions. Inequalities (in income) due to di¤erences in e¤ort are deemed equitable, whereas inequalities due to endowed circumstances are not. 5 In empirical estimations of EOp it is impossible to observe all characteristics that constitute individual's circumstances (e.g. innate talent or ability). Hence, in practice, all existing estimates of IOp are only lower bound estimates of the true share of unfair inequalities due to circumstances. 6 Estimating lower bounds of IOp has important implications for the design of redistributive policies. As most theories of distributive justice are based on ethical principles which only defend compensation for inequalities due to circumstances, underestimating the true amount of this IOp might lead to too little redistribution when designing a fair tax bene…t system (Luongo (2010)) -or to too much if the implicit assumption is that the upper bound is 100%. In addition, especially when comparing countries, the observed and unobserved circumstances might behave di¤erently which can lead to di¤erent conclusions when looking only at a(n observed) subset of all (potential) circumstances.
In order to tackle the lower-bound problem, we suggest a new estimator for IOp which takes into account the maximum value of (observed and unobserved) circumstances. Our method is based on a two-step approach. First, we estimate a …xed e¤ects model using panel data. We argue that the time-constant unobserved heterogeneity is the maximum amount of circumstance variables which an individual should not be held responsible for -as, by de…nition it comprises all exogenous circumstances as well as some unchanging e¤ort variables. Second, we use this estimated individual e¤ect to estimate the maximum extent of inequality which can be attributed to IOp, i.e. inequality due to circumstances. This two-stage estimator 5 This is related to the literature on wage discrimination (see, e.g., Altonji and Blank (1999) for an overview). However, a fundamental di¤erences exists between the two …elds. Labor economists studying discrimination are usually interested in estimating the direct e¤ect of endowed characteristics (e.g. race, gender) on income and try to separate it from confounding e¤ects due to between-group di¤erences in e¤ort. In contrast, the EOp literature believes that the confounding indirect e¤ect is also a source of unfair inequalities, i.e. a circumstance, itself that should not be separated from the direct e¤ect of circumstances on income (see, e.g., the discussion in Roemer (1998) ). We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 2. allows us to quantify an upper bound of IOp. Together with the well-known lower bound we thus provide a range for the extent of IOp which allows to better compare income distributions and to give guidelines for the design of redistribution policies.
To empirically illustrate our new estimator, we rely on the Cross-National Equivalent Files (CNEF) for Germany and the US which contain harmonized micro-level panel data from national surveys which cover long time periods and include a comprehensive set of income, circumstance and e¤ort variables. The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) data has been widely used for income inequality analyses (see, e.g. Fuchs-Schuendeln et al. (2010) , Peichl et al. (2011) ). However, it has not yet been used to analyze IOp. We compare our estimates to US data taken from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) which has been used by Pistolesi (2009) to analyze 'IOp in the land of opportunities'. Comparing the US with a Continental European country like Germany is interesting in itself (see, e.g. Piketty and Saez (2007) ), as both countries have di¤erent welfare state regimes and people have di¤erent beliefs about redistribution and social mobility. 7 Almås (2008) uses data from the Luxembourg Income Study to compare estimates of unfair inequalities for Germany and the US and shows that the results depend on the fairness ideal and the measure used. 8 Our lower bound estimates yield IOp shares of up about 16% for annual earnings in the US, which is comparable to previous …ndings. The upper bound of IOp, in contrast, accounts for around 35% of the observed inequality. Results for Germany are signi…cantly higher with shares of 30% and 50% respectively -which is in line with the …ndings of Almås (2008) . The signi…cant di¤erences between lower and upper bounds suggest that previous (lower bound) estimates of IOp might demand 7 There are a number of studies investigating social and economic mobility (see, e.g., Corak and Heisz (1999) , Björklund and Jaentti (1997 , 2009 ), or Björklund et al. (2010 . While these studies only implicitly measure IOp, we can directly estimate it in our approach. 8 Two di¤erent approaches have been used in literature to estimate IOp (see, e.g., Fleurbaey and Peragine (2009)): ex-ante vs. ex-post. The former partitions the population into types, i.e. groups of individuals endowed with the same set of circumstances, and IOp is measured as inequality between types. In the latter case, individuals are classi…ed into responsibility groups (tranches) of individuals at the same e¤ort level and inequality within tranches is investigated. Note that Almås (2008) argues that the ex-ante approach gives a lower bound because it treats the unexplained variation as an responsibility variable (see also the discussion in Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) ), whereas the ex-post approach would give an upper bound because it treats the residual as a circumstance. This, however, is only true for a given set of (observed) circumstances. De…ning the upper bound as in our case, gives lower and upper bounds both for the ex-ante and ex-post approaches. In our empirical application, we focus on the ex-ante approach due to practical reasons and data limitations. We discuss the two approaches in more detail in Section 2.
3 for too little redistribution in order to equalize unfair inequalities. Furthermore, our results based on annual incomes seem to indicate that EOp is higher in the "land of opportunities". However, as it has been shown in the literature, IOp is usually higher in permanent than in annual incomes ). We are able to con…rm this result for the lower and upper bound shares for the US, which increase to 30% and 70% respectively. However we do not …nd a large increase for Germany. Hence, when looking at permanent income, IOp is even slightly higher in the US. We relate this interesting country di¤erence to di¤erent degrees of mobility and persistence in di¤erent parts of the distribution ).
Results are similar for gross and net earnings. This implies that there is no di¤erential e¤ect of redistribution on IOp, i.e. there is no implicit tagging on circumstances in the tax systems of Germany and the US. Our results further indicate that unobserved circumstances, such as ability and talent, are important determinants of inequality (in line with …ndings for Sweden, see Björklund et al. (2011) ). Furthermore, we identify gender as an important source of IOp which is mainly driven by the indirect e¤ect of gender on earning outcomes through the selection into part-time employment. A policy simulation reveals that the switch from joint taxation to individual taxation signi…cantly reduces IOp in Germany.
The setup of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the conceptual framework of EOp and the methodology to estimate the upper bounds of IOp. Section 3 describes the data and income concepts used. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analysis which are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Conceptual Framework and Methodology

Measuring IOp: a simple model
In order to compare our new estimator to previous IOp estimates, we follow standard practice in the literature to de…ne our theoretical and empirical approaches. In accordance with Roemer (1998) , we distinguish between two generic determinants of individual outcome y is of individual i at time point s. First, circumstances C i are characteristics outside individual control (think of race, gender, family background) -and hence a source of inequitable inequalities in outcomes. Second, e¤ort E is is representing all factors a¤ecting earnings that are assumed to be the result of personal responsibility.
Following Roemer (1998) , we explicitly recognize the fact that e¤ort is shaped by circumstances, i.e. that the distribution of e¤ort within each type is itself a characteristic of the type. This approach, which is common in the literature on EOp, di¤ers from the literature on wage discrimination (see Altonji and Blank (1999) for an overview) where economists are usually interested in a 'clean' measure of the direct e¤ect of circumstances. Suppose there in an unobservable aspect of e¤ort that is correlated with an endowed characteristic. Then a regression of earnings on circumstances only (e.g. a gender dummy) overestimates the direct e¤ect of gender on earnings because it confounds the e¤ects of the endowed characteristic with a dimension of e¤ort that it is correlated with. Hence, economists studying discrimination control for between-group di¤erences in e¤ort in order to arrive at a 'clean' measure of the direct e¤ects of circumstances. In the literature on EOp, in contrast, the confounding indirect e¤ect (of circumstances on income via e¤ort) is also seen as a source of unfair inequalities itself which should be compensated and hence not be separated from the direct e¤ect of circumstances on income 9 . Therefore, IOp is related to wage discrimination, but it is not the same. Unfair income di¤erences in the IOp framework can be indeed caused by discrimination, but they could also be due to between-group di¤erences in productivity or preferences. Therefore, the two approaches imply di¤erent normative choices about the compensation of the indirect (confounding) e¤ect. While we focus on the traditional notion of EOp in this paper, the di¤erent normative choices of the underlying fairness principles can be made explicit (see Fleurbaey (2008) or Almås et al. (2011) ) and, in principle, it is possible to extend our approach of estimating an upper bound to other normative frameworks as well.
We assume that the outcome variable of interest depends both on exogenous, i.e. time-invariant, circumstances C i belonging to a …nite set = fC 1 ; C 2 ; :::; C N g ; as well as personal e¤ort E is , which can be shaped by C i ; belonging to a set = fE 1 ; E 2 ; :::; E N g. In our analysis, we focus on (annual or permanent) labor earnings w is of individual i at time point s which is generated by a function f :
As it is common in most parts of the literature, we do not explicitly take into 9 Note, however, that there is disagreement about the degree of compensation (see, e.g., the discussion in Roemer (1998) and Fleurbaey (2008)) account the role of luck. Hence, we (implicitly) assume that luck belongs to the sphere of individual responsibility and in our deterministic model, the individual is held responsible for any random component that may a¤ect the income and that cannot be attributed to the observed circumstances. 10 The same is true for potential measurement errors in the earnings data.
We follow the ex ante approach of equality of opportunity and partition the population of discrete agents i 2 f1; :::N g into a set of types = fT 1 ; T 2 ; :::T k g; i.e. subgroups of the population that are homogeneous in terms of their circumstances. 11 The income distribution within a type is a representation of the opportunity set which can be achieved for individuals with the same circumstances C i by exerting di¤erent degrees of e¤ort. EOp is achieved if the mean advantage levels are identical across types:
Measuring IOp thus means capturing the extent to which k (w) 6 = l (w), for k 6 = l.
To compute a measure of IOp, a hypothetical smoothed distribution (Foster and Shneyerov (2000) ) is constructed: k (w) = f (C i ; E); which is obtained when each individual outcome w k i is replaced by the group-speci…c mean for each type k (w) (for a given reference value of e¤ort E).
Based on this smoothed distribution, we compute two scalar measures of IOp for any (scale invariant) inequality index I:
where a is a measure of the absolute inequality of opportunity level (IOL), and r is the inequality of opportunity ratio (IOR) measuring the share of total inequality that can be attributed to circumstances. This allows to decompose the total income inequality into inequality within types (i.e. e¤ort inequality) and inequality between types (i.e. opportunity inequality). In order to respect the axioms of anonymity, Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, normalization, population replication, scale invariance and subgroup decomposability, we choose a member of the Generalized Entropy class (Shorrocks (1980) ) as inequality measure. By introducing the further requirement of path-independent decomposability (see Foster and Shneyerov (2000) ), the set of eligible indices reduces to the mean logarithmic deviation (MLD)
Empirical strategy to estimate IOp
Lower bound of IOp In our empirical estimation approach we follow Bourguignon et al. (2007) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) who use a parametric spe-ci…cation to estimate lower bounds of IOp. Relying on a parametric approach allows us to estimate the impact of numerous circumstance variables even in the presence of small sample and cell sizes -which, unfortunately, is the case in the data that we use for our empirical illustration. 12 Log-linearization of equation (1) and adding an error term yields the following empirical speci…cations
Equation (5) represents the direct e¤ect of circumstances, equation (6) the indirect e¤ect of circumstances on e¤ort. Since it is unlikely that we will observe all relevant circumstance and e¤ort variables that constitute individuals outcomes, estimating this model will likely yield biased estimates. However, in order to compute IOp shares, it is not necessary to estimate the structural model and to derive causal relationships. By substituting the e¤ort equation (6) into the earnings equation (5), we obtain the following reduced-form relationship:
This reduced-form equation can then be simply estimated by OLS to derive the fraction of variance which is explained by circumstances. Including all available k observed circumstances C K in equation (7), the estimates b measure the overall e¤ect of circumstances on labor earnings, combining both, the direct and indirect e¤ects. Based on this, we can construct a parametric estimate of the smoothed distribution:
As we replace earnings outcomes by their predictions (with 2 being the estimated residual variance in the earnings equation, see Blackburn (2007) ), all individuals with the same circumstances necessarily have the same advantage levels. Thus, in the case of absolute EOp, i.e. no income di¤erences due to (observed) circumstances C K i , all predicted earning levels would be identical. Consequently, IOp can then be measured as the inequality of these counterfactual earnings levels, where di¤erences are only due to di¤erences in circumstances. By inserting (8) into (3), we derive a measure of the absolute IOp level (IOL), whereas inserting (8) into (4) gives a measure of the relative IOp share (IOR).
The approach has so far been in line with the existing literature such as Bourguignon et al. (2007) , Checchi et al. (2010) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) . It has been recognized that this procedure leads to lower bound estimates of the true share of unfair inequalities due to circumstances. The intuition to this is just like that of an R 2 -measure which increases when adding another variable to the analysis: adding another circumstance variable to the analysis increases the explained variation (or at least does not decrease it in the case it is orthogonal), and hence the share of inequality due to circumstances cannot decrease. In the next step, we suggest a new estimator for IOp to tackle the lower-bound problem.
Upper bound of IOp Our method to derive an upper bound of IOp is based on a two-step approach. First, we estimate a …xed e¤ects model using panel data to derive a measure of time-constant unobserved heterogeneity. Second, we use this estimated unit e¤ect to estimate the maximum extent of inequality which can be attributed to inequality due to circumstances. The intuition for the di¤erence between lower and upper bounds of IOp is comparing the explained variance of an earnings equation with all observed circumstance variables (lower bound) to (one minus) the explained (within) variance of an …xed e¤ects regression (upper bound). However, instead of comparing the (explained) variances of the log earnings equations, we compute an inequality measure with well-de…ned properties based on the smoothed distributions. 13 To estimate the …xed-e¤ects model, we apply our setting to a longitudinal data structure. This implies that individual earnings at time point t (with t 6 = s) might be in ‡uenced by time-constant observable circumstances C i (economically exogenous by de…nition), by time-varying observable e¤ort variables E it as well as time-constant unobserved factors u i , time-speci…c unobserved factors u t and an independent error term " it :
Log-linearization yields the empirical speci…cation
which corresponds to the data generating process of a …xed e¤ects model with time-speci…c e¤ects. Thus u t takes up serial e¤ects such as in ‡ation and other time-speci…c earnings shocks which are common for all individuals and " it comprise unsystematic factors which in ‡uence wages. Using this longitudinal design enables us to derive consistent estimates for the e¤ort variables despite their endogeneity with respect to the unobserved circumstances. As opposed to other studies which assess the impact of e¤ort variables in EOp settings, we can also estimate the e¤ect independently of unobserved circumstances.
If one argues that all e¤ort variables are not exogenous in the sense that they vary over time (at least to some extent), then -given the time period is long enough -all time-constant unobserved heterogeneity is attributable to exogenous circumstances. Furthermore, assuming that no circumstance variables were observable, all circumstances were accounted for by the individual speci…c unit-e¤ect c i. :
As data limitations do not allow us to look at the whole earnings history of individuals, of course, we cannot be sure that there are no unobserved e¤ects in c i , which might rather be attributed to e¤ort, such as long-term motivation and work e¤ort. As this cannot be ruled out, we argue that the time-constant unobserved heterogeneity c i is the maximum amount of circumstance variables which an individual might not be held responsible for. 14 Estimating equation (11) by a simple FE model with period dummies then yields estimates forĉ i :
We use this estimate of the person e¤ect as an indicator for the maximum value of time-constant circumstances which an individual should not be held responsible -as by de…nition, it comprises all exogenous circumstances as well as some not changing e¤ort variables. Thus, this regression can be regarded as a pre-stage for estimating our …nal model of interest, where we useĉ i as a circumstance variable which includes all unobservable and observable (which we treat as unobserved) timeconstant circumstances of an individual. When estimating our model of interest we go back to a cross-sectional setting and use the annual earnings ln(w is ) of time point s (with s 6 = t) as dependent variable (identical with the lower bound estimation) and simply estimate the reduced-form (bivariate) model:
Again, as in the lower bound case, we construct a parametric estimate of the smoothed distribution by replacing individual earnings by their predictions:
Based on these predicted counterfactual levels, we derive upper bound measures of IOp, by inserting (14) Ex-ante vs. ex-post -upper and lower bounds for e¤ort inequality In the (empirical) EOp literature, two di¤erent approaches have been used to estimate IOp (see, e.g., Fleurbaey and Peragine (2009)): ex-ante vs. ex-post. The (lowerbound) IOp shares from the ex-ante approach are smaller than the IOp shares from the ex-post approach (Checchi et al. (2010) ). The di¤erence between the two approaches can be explained with how unobserved factors are treated. Almås (2008) argues that the ex-ante approach treats the unexplained variation as an responsibility variable and hence gives a lower bound, whereas the ex-post approach, in contrast, treats it as a circumstance which would give an upper bound. This, however, is only true for a given set of (observed) circumstances. De…ning the upper bound as in our case (observed vs. unobserved circumstances), gives lower and upper bounds both for the ex-ante and ex-post approaches. 15 The ex-ante (lower bound) approach di¤erentiates between inequality due to observed circumstances vs. residual inequality which is assigned to e¤ort. This gives a lower bound for IOp -as described above -and hence an upper bound for e¤ort inequality. Our (ex-ante) upper bound for circumstance inequality is also a lower bound for e¤ort inequality, as the unobserved (not changing) residual e¤ort is picked up by the circumstance IOp in this case.
While the ex-ante approach focuses on measuring inequality between types (individuals with the same circumstances), the ex-post approach looks at inequality within tranches of individuals, i.e. people at the same quantile of the e¤ort/outcome distribution with di¤erent circumstances. Due to practical reasons, however, the number of circumstances which are incorporated in the analysis is limited to a small number of types (e.g. 3 types according to father's education). By doing this, the residual is implicitly assigned to IOp. This is, however, not an upper bound as adding another circumstances variable in this setting can still increase the contribution of explained variance due to circumstances. It is straightforward to apply our method for an upper bound of IOp to the ex-post setting as well by de…ning types based on the unit e¤ect. In the extreme case that everybody is his/her own type, the upper bound of IOp equals outcome inequality, i.e. the share is 100%. In our empirical application, we focus on the ex-ante approach due to practical reasons and data limitations. 16
Data
We use the Cross-National Equivalent Files (CNEF) of the SOEP for Germany and the PSID for the US for our estimations. The CNEF contains harmonized data from the respective national panel surveys. The SOEP is a representative panel study of households and individuals in Germany that has been conducted annually since 1984. 17 We use information from all available waves from the SOEP from 1984 until 2009 (since 1991 also including East Germany). The PSID began in 1968 (since 1997 only biennially ) and the most current wave is from 2007. In our analysis we use information from 1981 onwards, since speci…c information on the occupation and industry of the individual is not available in previous PSID waves. 18 In line with the previous literature, the units of our analysis are individuals aged 25-55 who are in (part-or full-time) employment. The dependent variables are logarithmic real (annual or permanent) labor earnings, adjusted by consumer prices indices. Inequality measures are based on the corresponding absolute levels of earnings. To derive satisfying estimates of the unit-e¤ect, a long time period is needed. Consequently, we base our analysis only on those individuals who report positive earnings for at least …ve subsequent points in time. 19 We further restrict our sample to individuals with data on parental background.
We …rst estimate lower bounds of IOp by using either log annual earnings of the most current wave (2009 for Germany, 2007 for the US) or log permanent incomesproxied by average real earnings over the whole period 20 . In a second set of estimations, we rely on permanent log earnings which are computed as the individual's mean income over the observation period.
As circumstance variables, we include gender, a dummy whether the individual was born in a foreign country, categorical variables of the occupation and education of the father, the degree of urbanization of the place where the individual was born as well as the height and year of birth of the individual. In the case of Germany, we include a dummy if the individual was born in East Germany, and for the US we include a corresponding dummy whether the individual was born in the South. Additionally, we include a variable for the US which indicates the race of the individual. Summary statistics on the mean annual earnings and all employed circumstance variables are illustrated in Table 2 in the Appendix.
In our longitudinal …xed e¤ects earnings regressions, we include as e¤ort variables weekly working hours, age-standardized experience, individual's education in years, as well as industry dummies. We term these variables e¤ort variables since they can be a¤ected by responsible individual choices. In the case that these variables do not vary over time, they are included in the …xed e¤ect and hence counted as a circumstances. This is why the FE model gives an upper bound for IOp. Summary statistics of these variables are illustrated in Table 3 in the Appendix.
Empirical results
Estimation of earnings equations
Derivation of lower bound of IOp The …rst step of our analysis is the estimation of the log earnings equation (7) for the most current survey wave (Germany: SOEP 2009; US: PSID 2007) on all observable circumstances which are expected to have an impact on individual labor earnings. The results of these reduced-form OLS regressions are illustrated in Table 5 in the Appendix. The speci…cations in the …rst column are based on the whole sample, in the second and third columns the sample is restricted to male and female individuals, respectively. The …rst set of regressions for each country is based on periodical incomes, the second set on permanent incomes.
The …rst column for each set shows that women have signi…cantly lower labor earnings than men in all speci…cations -the well-known gender wage gap, with values around 50%. A large fraction of the earnings di¤erence is due to the fact that women are more likely to be employed in part-time employment. However, the e¤ect is still negative and signi…cant when only looking at full-time employed (result available upon request), implying that there are further negative opportunities for women.
The e¤ect of being born in a foreign country is negative and signi…cant in Germany. In the US, being 'non-white' reveals an earnings decreasing e¤ect for permanent incomes but not for annual incomes. 21 Being born in a disadvantaged region is related to signi…cantly lower earnings in both countries. In Germany, the e¤ect is more pronounced in the male subsample, whereas in the US, this is the case in the female subsample. Individuals who were born in a larger city have on average larger earnings than individuals who grew up in the countryside.
The regressions also reveal that the education of the father matters for the acquisition of individual earnings. If the father has an upper secondary (college) education, the children's wages are signi…cantly higher in both countries. Accordingly, the occupational status of the father also matters in both countries. If the father was occupied as a white-collar worker or as a professional rather than in bluecollar professions, this is associated with signi…cantly higher earnings in Germany. In the US, a self-employed father seems to be particularly favorable for the earnings acquisition of their children.
As expected, later born (i.e. younger) individuals have smaller earnings. Here the e¤ect is more robust in Germany. The same is true for body height, which has a substantial positive impact in all speci…cations in Germany. Interestingly, in the US this e¤ect is only evident in the male subsample. Overall, the observed circumstances can explain up to 26.3% of the overall variation in log earnings in Germany, and up to 29.5% in the US. In a world of equal opportunities, these exogenous circumstances should actually have no e¤ect on earnings -hinting that at least some degree of IOp exists in both countries.
Derivation of upper bound of IOp To derive upper bounds of IOp, the …rst step is the FE estimation of the earnings equation (11) on the observable timevarying e¤ort variables. Table 6 in the Appendix presents the results. Again, we run separate regressions for periodical and permanent income as well as men and women. Overall, the models explain up to 42% of the within-variation of real earnings in Germany and up to 36% in the US. The unexplained part is a …rst hint for the existence (and size) of the upper bound IOp.
In Germany, we …nd a clear non-linear relationship between age-standardized experience and earnings in almost all speci…cations -with the exception of the male subsample in the US. Not surprisingly, working hours have a signi…cant positive impact on earnings in both countries and the e¤ect is robust across all speci…cations. The same is true for education. With regard to the industry dummies, in both countries, an occupation in the energy and mining, manufacturing, construction, transportation, …nancial (only in the US) and health sector is associated with higher earnings than if you are employed in the public sector (reference).
Lower and upper bounds of IOp
In the next step, the coe¢ cients of the reduced-form OLS regression (7) are used to predict counterfactual advantage levels e LB in annual earnings which are only due to di¤erences in circumstances. Thus, if there were an absolute EOp, all predicted advantage levels e LB would be exactly the same. This smoothed distribution e LB is then used to compute the lower bound IOp measures.
The upper bound measures are derived from the FE model. Based on the …rststage FE wage regressions, we predict the unit-e¤ects for all individuals, as suggested by equation (12). In the next step, we use these indicators of the maximum amount of circumstancesĉ i as independent variables to estimate equation (13). Now, the dependent variable are the individual's logarithmic labor earnings in 2009 (2007) for Germany (the US). The coe¢ cients of this OLS regression are then used to predict counterfactual advantage levels e U B in annual earnings which are only due to di¤erences in the unobserved heterogeneity.
The MLD for inequality in outcomes (total bar) as well as the counterfactual smoothed distributions for the lower (dark grey) and upper (medium grey) bounds are presented in Figure 1 . Inequality in periodical (permanent) incomes is reported in the upper (lower) panel both for the US and Germany for the full sample as well as separated by gender. Furthermore, for each subgroup, the left bar is based on gross earnings whereas the right bar is based on net earnings.
Inequality levels
We start by examining annual labor earnings (upper panel). Our results reveal a MLD of 0.26 (0.21) for Germany and 0.35 (0.29) in the US for gross (net) earnings. Not surprisingly, redistribution reduces outcome inequality in both countries and in all samples. Inequality of outcomes is substantially larger in the US than in Germany in all samples, which is in line with previous …ndings. In Germany, the inequality in earnings is substantially smaller (higher) if we look at the male (female) sample separately. This indicates that men are more likely employed in full-time jobs and thus earnings are distributed more homogenously than across women -which have a much higher variation in hours worked. In the US, the outcome inequality levels are similar in the male and female subsamples. Inequality in permanent incomes is substantially lower in the US than inequality in annual incomes. In Germany, this is only the case for the female subsample whereas the decrease is rather small for the full sample which could hint at lower income mobility in Germany (van Kerm (2004) ). Therefore, inequality in permanent incomes is surprisingly similar between Germany and the US.
The lower bound IOp estimations control for a full range of observed circumstance variables such as gender, country and region of origin, height as well as father's education and occupation. Based on annual incomes, the MLD levels are rather similar between Germany (0.07) and the US (0.06) for the full samples. However, the di¤erence is statistically signi…cant as suggested by the bootstrapped con…dence intervals in Table 4 in the Appendix. Redistribution has only a small e¤ect on the lower bounds in both countries. When looking at the male and female subsamples separately, the IOp levels decrease. This is a …rst indication that gender is an important (observed) circumstance and in line with the large male-female wage gap found in Table 5 . The results for permanent incomes are almost identical suggesting no great di¤erence between the two income concepts in terms of (lower bound) IOp levels.
The upper bound IOp levels are also rather similar for annual income in all IOp shares In order to get a feeling for the relative importance of IOp, Figure  2 presents the range for IOp shares, i.e. the IOp levels divided by the MLD for outcome inequality (between group inequality as fraction of total inequality). The upper (lower) line corresponds to the upper (lower) bound share. Again, results are presented for periodical (permanent) incomes in the upper (lower) panel both for the US and Germany for the full sample as well as separated by gender for gross (left, darker bar) and net (right, lighter bar) earnings. The IOp shares are signi…cantly higher for Germany than for the US for annual incomes, which is due to lower absolute levels of outcome inequality while having similar values of IOp -which is in line with the …ndings of Almås (2008) . The lower bound shares equal 30% in Germany and 16% in the US -the latter is comparable to previous …ndings (Pistolesi (2009) ). Based on these results, it would be possible to deduce that individual earnings are mainly driven by individual's e¤ort choices and only to a lesser extent by circumstances. Our upper bound estimates, however, suggest that earnings are to a larger extent pre-determined by exogenous circumstances. We …nd upper bounds of IOp of around 50% in Germany and 35% in the US. The di¤erences are statistically signi…cant.
Thus, it seems that there is substantially less IOp in the US compared to Germany, i.e. one could conclude that equality of opportunity is higher in the "land of opportunities". However, using permanent instead of annual incomes matters for inequality levels, especially in the US, where IOp levels are much higher for permanent incomes (comparable to the …ndings of Pistolesi (2009) ). In Germany, the di¤erence between inequality levels for the two income concepts is much smaller. Therefore, inequality levels (and hence the IOp shares) are similar for both income concepts. Hence, the IOp shares for permanent incomes are higher in the US than in Germany.
Again, the lower bound IOp shares are substantially smaller when we look at the female and male sample separately. This again hints at gender as an important source of IOp. However, the e¤ect is not as strong for the upper bounds based on the unit-e¤ect as circumstance variable. This indicates that a large share of the inequality in outcomes can be explained by unobserved heterogeneity of individuals.
Gross vs. net incomes
We …nd that the di¤erences between gross and net income inequality, i.e. the redistributive e¤ects of the tax bene…t systems, are rather similar between Germany and the US. This might be surprising at a …rst glance, since European welfare states are usually said to be more redistributive. But in our exercise, as we focus on the working age population, this is not the case. The main di¤erence in redistribution between Germany and the US is due to bene…ts (especially for the unemployed) and not due to the progressivity of the income tax which is rather similar in both countries. In our sample, we focus on individuals who are working. They pay taxes and receive almost no bene…ts -except for child credits which are comparable between both countries. Hence, the redistributive e¤ects for this subgroup of the population is rather similar between Germany and the US.
Discussion of Results
' Explaining'the results
Annual vs. permanent incomes The result that IOp in permanent incomes in the US is much higher than for annual incomes -which is not the case for Germany, might be explained by di¤erent mobility patterns between both countries. In general, mobility is higher in the US (van Kerm (2004)). However, in the US much higher persistence and hence lower mobility -compared to European countries -is observed at the tails of the distribution ). Whereas in countries like Germany, mobility is on average lower, it is more equally spread across the distribution. In the US, in contrast, there is much higher mobility in the middle, but, compared to other countries, the probability for the poor (rich) to make it to the top (bottom) is much lower. This persistence of inequality at the tails of the distribution might help to explain IOp levels in permanent incomes are much higher in the US, i.e. the rags-to-riches story is less common than usually thought, as it has been shown that IOp is generally higher at the tails ).
Gross vs. net incomes
We have seen that there is basically no di¤erence between the IOp shares between gross and net earnings in both countries. This does not imply that policy does not matter -in contrast, the IOp levels are considerably lower in both countries. However, the results indicate that there is no di¤erential e¤ect of the tax bene…t system in our sample. This is not surprising for two reasons. First, tagging, i.e. the use of exogenous circumstance information to determine tax liabilities and bene…t eligibility, is usually not explicitly used in existing tax bene…t systems due to anti-discrimination laws. Second, we focus on the working population between 25-55. These individually usually pay taxes but receive little bene…ts in both countries. Implicit tagging, i.e. designing rules and conditions such that individual with certain circumstances are more likely to be eligible for it, is much less common in the tax system than for bene…ts. Hence, one would expect that existing tax bene…t systems do not account for the source of inequalities -whether equitable (due to e¤ort) or not (due to circumstances) -when redistributing income. Therefore, in order to improve the fairness (and e¢ ciency) of the redistributive system, tagging on circumstances has to be increased (Ooghe and Peichl (2010) ).
Policy simulation As we have seen, gender di¤erences play an important role for the EOp gap. Most of it was due to the indirect e¤ect that women tend to work fewer hours. Part of this is due to the tax bene…t rules -especially the system of joint taxation which yields high marginal tax rates for the second earnerusually the wife. Based on IZA's behavioral microsimulation model for the German tax and transfer system (IZA MOD, see Peichl et al. (2010) for an overview), we simulate the abolishment of the joint taxation system in Germany by introducing pure individual taxation to illustrate the importance of policy for the extent of EOp.
The abolishment of joint taxation increases (decreases) married women's (men's) labor supply. 23 When looking at the resulting IOp levels, we …nd that this policy change indeed leads to lower IOp (the upper and lower bound indices decrease by more than 10% each). Given the fact that this policy a¤ects only married couples and that we focus on the intensive margin, this reduction is quite substantial. Furthermore, this policy is also associated with higher tax revenue which could be used to promote child care policies to further increase female labor force participation and reduce IOp.
Robustness checks
Di¤erent inequality measures Although the other measures from the GE family violate the path-independent decomposability axiom, it is still insightful to see that the results are not driven by the choice of MLD which can be seen in Figure  3 . For both, Germany and the US, the resulting lower and upper bound IOp shares of the MLD compared to the Theil (1) index (GE(1)) are very similar. With respect to the half squared coe¢ cient of variation (GE(2)), which is particularly sensitive to changes at the top of the income distribution, we do observe some di¤erences. Using this inequality measure generally leads to lower IOp shares in all samples. The di¤erences are more pronounced in the US than in Germany, and the range of IOp shares particularly decreases in the case of annual incomes.
Di¤erent samples
In order to further check the sensitivity of our results, we examine di¤erent samples. The results are illustrated in Table 1 . First, we restrict our sample to full-time employed individuals. For Germany, this leads to a decrease of the lower bound share of IOp of almost ten percentage points. This substantial decrease may be explained by the less explanatory power of the gender dummy when only looking at full-time employed individuals. The upper bound increases, on the other hand. For the US, the results remain fairly similar to those in the baseline sample. Thus, the qualitative di¤erences between Germany and the US remain. Note, however, that the sample size are substantially smaller than in the baseline estimations. When we restrict our sample to prime-aged 30-45 aged individuals, the results are very similar as those in the baseline estimations, except for the US where we …nd a substantial increase in the upper bound IOp share.
In our baseline estimations we derive the unit-e¤ect based on observations from unbalanced panels. Thus, we also run estimations which we base on balanced panels over a time period of ten years. The results for the most current balanced panel are very similar as our baseline results. For Germany, however, we …nd a considerable decrease of the upper bound for the previous time period, whereas in the US the upper bound share is larger when looking at the earlier time period.
Finally, we also test the responsiveness of our results with respect to sample selection due to missing values in circumstances variables. As expected, the lower bound decreases when reducing the circumstance set. In line with our model the results for the upper bound IOp shares remain very stable and are therefore independent of the circumstances set.
The role of luck
So far, we have assumed that luck belongs to the sphere of individual responsibility. In the (philosophical) debate about whether luck should be compensated or not, a distinction is made between 'brute luck'on the one hand and 'option luck'on the other. The former is a random shock not associated with any (e¤ort-related) choices (e.g. being struck by a lightning), whereas the latter is a consequence of a choice (e.g. winning or losing money while gambling) and should not be compensated. Hence, by neglecting (brute) luck, we (implicitly) assumed that all individual shocks are option luck, which was reasonable since our empirical analysis was mainly meant to illustrate the di¤erence between lower and upper bound estimates.
Additionally accounting for brute luck gives the 'true'upper bound. However, the empirical identi…cation of the two forms of luck is not straightforward. Nonetheless, our approach of estimating an upper bound can be extended following Lefranc et al. (2009) . In order to illustrate this, and as a further robustness check, we now assume that all unobserved factors are non-responsibility characteristics, i.e. brute luck. Hence, we modify equation (13) in the following way in order to separate the e¤ect of observed e¤ort variables and unobserved factors:
We then construct a parametric estimate of the smoothed distribution explicitly taking into account the error term is :
Based on these predicted counterfactual levels, we then derive new upper bound measures of IOp taking into account luck. This gives an upper upper bound estimate of IOp as we do not only capture time-constant e¤ort (in the unit e¤ect) but also unobserved e¤ort as well as option luck in the error term. The results are illustrated in Figure 4 . The darker grey bar line shows the range between the lower and upper bound as previously de…ned, whereas the upper, lighter grey line shows the di¤erence to the upper bound when additionally accounting for luck. When accounting for luck, the upper bound does not change much in the German data for the full sample and the female subsample. The change is higher for the male subsample as well as in the US data for all samples. These results point towards a higher importance of unobserved e¤ort or indeed luck in the cases where the luckadjusted upper bound is much higher. The results for the US are also much more in line with the …ndings for permanent incomes, where we found higher upper bound IOp shares for the US than for Germany.
To sum up, our approach of estimating an upper bound does not depend on the assumption about the responsibility cut for luck. With the appropriate data and identi…cation strategy that would allow for separating brute luck from option luck, it would be possible to estimate the 'true'upper bound. 
Conclusion
The existing literature on EOp provides only lower bound estimates of IOp. We suggest a two-stage estimator based on a …xed e¤ects model to tackle this issue. The maximum amount of circumstances which an individual should not be held responsible is the person's …xed e¤ect, as by de…nition, it comprises all exogenous circumstances as well as some not changing e¤ort variables. Using this unit e¤ect as a circumstance measure enables us to quantify the maximum amount of inequality which can be attributed to IOp. We apply the method to a rich set of harmonized micro-level panel data for Germany and the US in order to empirically illustrate our new estimator and to compare it to the well-known lower bound. The IOp levels are rather similar between Germany and the US in terms of the lower and upper bounds for annual incomes and the lower bound for permanent incomes. For the latter, the upper bound levels are higher in the US than in Germany. The IOp shares are higher for Germany (30-50%) than for the US (16-35%) for annual incomes which is due to lower absolute levels of outcome inequality while having similar values of IOp. This result might help to explain why attitudes towards inequality and redistribution di¤er substantially between both countries ( Figure 5 in the Appendix). Contrary to Germany, the majority of respondents in the US thinks that larger income di¤erences are necessary as incentives, while 40% of the respondents think that the most important reason why people live in need is laziness -the numbers are only half as high in Germany. However, when moving to a measure of permanent income, we …nd larger (lower and upper bound) IOp shares for the US, which increase to 30% and 70% respectively. However, we do not …nd a substantial increase for Germany. We explain this di¤erence with di¤erent degrees of mobility and persistence in di¤erent parts of the distribution ). The persistence of inequality at the tails of the distribution suggests that the rags-to-riches (or vice versa) story is less common than usually thought.
To sum up, we …nd signi…cant and robust di¤erences between lower and upper bound estimates for both countries for all speci…cations. At a …rst sight, the high IOp shares for the upper bound might seem surprising. However, it should be noted that our estimate of unobserved heterogeneity also includes all unobserved abilities and innate talent. This is in line with Björklund et al. (2011) , who indicate that the intelligence quotient (IQ) is the most important circumstance among the variables that they consider to explain di¤erences in earnings. In addition, results from the literature on sibling correlations also emphasize the importance of family background and genetic material (Solon (1999), ). Furthermore, recent results from the literature on the e¤ect of human capital on wage dispersion show that individual characteristics (e.g. Bagger et al. (2010) ) as well as initial conditions (e.g. Hugget et al. (2011) ) account for most of the variation in annual as well as lifetime earnings. Although we do not claim that our upper bound estimates present the true amount of IOp, they provide evidence that the existing lower bound estimates substantially underestimate IOp and thus might demand for too little redistribution to equalize inequalities due to circumstances.
Our results also reveal the importance of gender as one driving force of IOp. The e¤ect of gender is considerably smaller when only looking at full-time employed individuals. Thus, the gender opportunity gap is mainly due to the indirect e¤ect of gender on earnings: women are more likely employed in part-time jobs. Introducing a policy change which is likely to increase female labor supply -such as the move from joint to individual taxation -indeed reduces the IOp bounds by about two percentage points. This suggests that policies can be a useful tool to change IOp -and also that existing policies might actually increase IOp. It would be interesting to analyze the e¤ect of tax systems that are based on exogenous characteristics (Ooghe and Peichl (2010) ) on IOp in future research. Solon, G. (1999) . Intergenerational mobility in the labor market, in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3A, North-Holland Elsevier Science, pp. 1761-1800. Van de gaer, D. (1993) . Equality of Opportunity and Investment in Human Capital, KU Leuven.
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